Recent empirical research on mutual fund tournaments examines the relation between prior performance, the structure of compensation, and a fund manager's choice of portfolio risk. This paper models the portfolio decisions of a fund manager who competes in such a tournament. Explicit solutions for the manager's portfolio choice are derived for compensation rules that can be either a concave, linear, or convex function of the fund's performance relative to that of a benchmark. The model shows that assumptions made in prior empirical research may not hold. For particular compensation structures, a manager increases the fund's "tracking error" as its relative performance declines. However, in contrast to the received wisdom, declining performance does not necessarily lead the manager to raise the variance of the fund's return.
I. Introduction
As mutual fund investing has grown, the management of mutual funds has come under closer scrutiny by financial economists. One strand of research examines potential agency problems between a mutual fund's shareholders and its portfolio manager. Several studies investigate whether a manager might unnecessarily shift the fund's risk in response to changes in its performance relative to other funds. This behavior is linked to the way the manager is compensated and to the actions of mutual fund investors. The manager's compensation depends on her success in generating flows of new investments into the fund, while mutual fund investors "chase returns" by channeling investments into funds with better relative performance. This creates a situation described as a mutual fund "tournament" where portfolio managers compete for better performance, greater fund inflows, and, ultimately, higher compensation.
Inflows rise nonlinearly with a fund's relative performance. Numerous studies document that mutual funds with the best recent performance experience a lion's share of new inflows, but poorly performing funds are not penalized with sharply higher outflows.
1 If the fund manager's compensation rises in proportion to the fund's inflows, this convex performance -fund flow relation produces a convex performance -compensation structure. 2 Research, such as Sirri and Tufano (1998) , notes that such compensation is similar to a call option, producing an incentive for the manager to raise the risk of the fund's relative returns and increase the option's value. To empirically test for the presence of this risk-taking incentive, studies have compared the behavior of a cross-section of mutual funds for which this risk-taking incentive is predicted to differ. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) estimate the shape of the performance -fund flow relation and use it to infer different funds' risk-taking incentives. They, like other studies, assume that a fund's inflows respond primarily to its relative performance calculated over the previous calendar year. Thus fund managers compete in annual tournaments that begin in January and end 1 Studies examining the fund flow -performance relationship include Ippolito (1992) , Gruber (1996) , Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , Sirri and Tufano (1998) , Goetzmann and Peles (1997) , and Del Guercio and Tkac (1999) . 2 The literature on mutual fund tournaments distinguishes between a fund's investment advisor, the entity responsible for portfolio management, and the portfolio manager hired by the advisor. The typical investment advisor is paid a fixed fraction of the fund's assets, assets that depend on both net fund inflows (external growth of assets) and the fund's return (internal growth of assets). However, the portfolio manager's compensation is assumed to depend only on his ability to generate extraordinary growth in fund assets, growth that depends on the fund's return relative to (the average of) other funds' returns. Common or systematic shocks to all funds' returns (affecting internal asset growth) are not due to the individual manager's portfolio selection ability and would not affect compensation. Hence, compensation is assumed to depend on relative, not absolute, performance.
The current paper clarifies issues in this mutual fund tournament literature by providing new theoretical and empirical insights into risk-taking by mutual funds. First, it models the optimal intertemporal portfolio strategy of a mutual fund manager that faces the competitive "tournament" environment assumed by recent empirical work. Explicit solutions for this manager's portfolio allocation are derived when her utility displays constant relative risk aversion and compensation is either a concave, linear, or convex function of the fund's relative calendar-year performance.
An important implication of the model is that when the penalty for poor performance is limited so that the manager's total compensation can never fall to zero, then the fund manager chooses to deviate more from the benchmark portfolio as the fund's performance declines. In other words, when a fund is performing poorly it displays more "tracking error" than when it performs relatively well. It is not true, however, that the manager of a poorly performing fund necessarily increases the variance of the fund's returns, as some previous empirical studies assume. Rather, under-performance can lead to more tracking error volatility but less variance of returns. Hence, the tests for shifts in returns variances performed by Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Busse (2001) may not determine whether fund managers truly are acting opportunistically.
Second, the paper develops a new, more powerful, empirical technique that is used to reexamine the evidence on risk-taking in the mutual fund industry. Our approach improves upon previous methods because it is consistent with a theory of managerial behavior, it allows a fund's risk to change at each observation date not just once per year, and it can be applied to estimate risk-shifting incentives of individual mutual funds not only the entire industry. We apply this technique to data on more than 4,000 mutual funds that operated during the 1962 to 2001 period, a much larger sample than those of previous studies. As predicted by our model, most mutual funds are found to increase tracking error, but not return variance, as their performance declines.
Based on these results, we also explore whether risk-shifting is systematically linked to mutual funds with particular characteristics.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II briefly discusses related theoretical work on the risk-taking incentives of mutual fund managers. In section III we present our model of a mutual fund manager whose compensation depends on the fund's end-of-year relative performance. Throughout the year, the manager can rebalance the fund's portfolio as its performance changes. His optimal portfolio choice is derived for a compensation schedule that, depending on its parameter values, can be concave, linear, or convex in the fund's relative performance. Section IV develops a new empirical method for testing the risk-taking behavior implied by our model. Section V describes our data, while section VI presents the empirical results regarding risk-taking by of over 4,000 mutual funds. Concluding comments are in section VII.
II. Related Literature on a Portfolio Manager's Choice of Risk
A growing literature analyzes the theoretical behavior of portfolio managers and investors. Many of these studies examine the link between a fund manager's compensation contract and his choice of the fund's portfolio. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) show how compensation contracts that include a bonus for good performance can produce adverse risk incentives. Mutual fund managers can maximize the present value of their option-like bonus by choosing a fund portfolio with excessive risk. Moreover, the fund manager could capture, without risk, the increased value of this bonus if she can hedge using her personal wealth. Starks (1987) also considers the effects of a bonus contract, focusing on situations of asymmetric information between fund investors and fund managers. When investors cannot observe a manager's choice of portfolio risk or the manager's effort level, compensation contracts with symmetric payoffs dominate contracts that include a bonus. However, Das and Rangarajan (2001) show that the relative advantages of symmetric and bonus contracts can be reversed if investors' choice of funds is made endogenous to the funds' risk levels and compensation contracts. In their model, bonus contracts provide better risk-sharing between investors and fund managers when investors take account of a fund's risk and contract choice.
Other research, such as Huberman and Kandel (1993) , Heinkel and Stoughton (1994), and Huddart (1999) , considers environments where fund managers possess different abilities that are unbeknownst to investors. In these game-theoretic models, there is typically an initial period when investors learn of managers' abilities based on their relative performances, followed by a second period during which investors can switch their savings to those managers perceived to have the highest abilities. Hence, these "investor learning" models can explain the link between fund flows and prior performance. In addition, if managerial ability displays decreasing returns to scale, Berk and Green (2001) show that flows determine the relative sizes of funds such that, in equilibrium, mutual fund investors expect no future superior returns net of fund fees and expenses.
The model in the current paper differs from this previous work by focusing on how prior performance affects a fund manager's choice of portfolio risk. It stresses the intertemporal reactions of fund managers that have been the basis of empirical studies, such as Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) , Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , and Busse (2001) . The model takes the structure of managerial compensation as given and studies a manager's dynamic portfolio choice over an annual "tournament" evaluation period. Recent work by Carpenter (2000) and Cuoco and Kaniel (1999) is related to ours. These papers assume that the performance-related components of a portfolio manager's compensation consist of options written on the portfolio's value. Carpenter (2000) assumes a risk-averse manager is compensated in the form a fixed-fee plus a call option written on the value of the managed portfolio with an exercise price equal to the value of a benchmark asset. Cuoco and Kaniel (1999) is similar, but their model also allows the compensation contract to contain a penalty for poor performance in the form of the manager writing a put option on the managed portfolio.
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While we also assume that a portfolio manager's compensation depends on the portfolio's performance relative to a benchmark, the contract is not strictly in the form of standard call or put options. Rather than being an option-like, piece-wise linear function of performance, our contract assumes compensation is a smooth function that can be either concave, linear, or convex in relative performance. This is done to better capture the type of managerial compensation assumed in recent empirical studies of mutual fund tournaments, namely, compensation that depends on a fund's assets under management and, hence, the manager's ability to generate fund inflows. 8 Empirical evidence suggests that fund inflows are poorly modeled as a simple piece-wise linear function of performance. Moreover, our form of compensation is flexible enough to generate different equilibrium relationships between prior performance and a manager's choice of risk, yet it leads to simple and intuitive closed-form solutions. This simplicity allows the model to directly guide our later empirical tests of mutual fund behavior. However, while our model differs from those of Carpenter (2000) and Cuoco and Kaniel (1999) , we discuss below how all three produce the same qualitative results when similar assumptions are made.
7 Cuoco and Kaniel (1999) focus on the equilibrium asset pricing implications of different portfolio manager compensation contracts rather than on a manager's incentive to shift the fund's risk in response its performance. They consider an economy with individual investors and a fund manager who can choose among a bond and two stocks that are in fixed supply. Given the dividend process of each of the stocks, one of which represents an index and the other which represents a stock not in the index, they numerically solve for the equilibrium expected returns and volatilities of the stocks under different compensation rules. 8 The contract in Carpenter (2000) may better represent the compensation of a non-financial firm manager who receives stock options, while the contract in Cuoco and Kaniel (1999) may be most appropriate to the compensation of other portfolio managers, such as managers of pension funds.
III. Modeling a Mutual Fund Manager's Portfolio Decisions
We now describe our model's specific assumptions. A fund manager's compensation is assumed to depend on the fund's performance relative to a benchmark index. The fund's portfolio can be invested partly in this benchmark index and partly in a set of "alternative" securities chosen by its fund manager. These alternative securities are defined as the portion of the fund's total assets that accounts for the difference between the fund's portfolio and one that is invested solely in the benchmark portfolio. 9 The Appendix shows that the fund manager's optimal choice of individual alternative securities is one where their relative portfolio proportions do not vary over time. This implies that the manager's intertemporal portfolio choice problem can be transformed to one of allocating a portion of the fund's portfolio to the benchmark index and the remaining portion to a single alternative composite security. 10 Hence, we simplify the presentation by assuming at the start that the portfolio allocation problem involves only two types of securities: the benchmark index and a single alternative security. If the fund manager allocates a portfolio proportion of 1-ω to the benchmark index and a proportion ω to the alternative securities, then the fund's portfolio's value, V, follows the process:
Note that whenever ω ≠ 0, the fund's return in (3) deviates from the benchmark return. We can also calculate the process followed by the fund's relative performance. Define G t ≡ V t /S t to be the date t ratio of the value of the fund's portfolio to that of the benchmark. A simple application of Itô's lemma shows that
The fund manager is assumed to compete in a tournament for inflows into the fund. At the start of the tournament's assessment period, G = 1 by definition, but then changes stochastically according to equation (4). Thus, G t measures the date t ratio of the fund's return to that of the benchmark since the start of the tournament, and hence D t ≡ ln(G t ) is the difference between the fund's continuously-compounded return and that of the benchmark index since the beginning of the tournament. 12 The tournament ends at date T, which, for example, could be the last trading day of the calendar year. The manager's compensation is a function of the fund's relative performance at the end of the tournament, so that his compensation or "pay" can be written as P[G T ].
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11 The Appendix derives the values of α A and σ A in terms of the parameters of processes for n individual alternative securities. 12 We refer to relative performance as the ratio of returns, G t , rather than the difference in returns, D t , but this distinction is nonessential. The manager's compensation function could be rewritten in terms of lnG t , rather than G t . As will be shown, a manager's optimal portfolio choice is independent of prior performance when compensation is proportional to a power of G t rather than D t , so the ratio is a natural variable to use. 13 In practice, compensation may depend also on the performance of the overall equity (mutual fund) market. Karceski (2002) shows that a fund's inflows are highest when the fund performs relatively well and, simultaneously, the overall stock market performs well. He studies the implications of this phenomenon for fund managers' selection of high versus low beta stocks and the equilibrium effects on asset prices. Though our analysis omits this market effect, including would not fundamentally change how managers respond to prior relative performance. Rather, it would influence the average level of market (beta) risk chosen by fund managers. 14 The assumption that compensation depends only on the fund's performance relative to a single index is a simplification for another reason. In general, a fund's net inflows, and hence its manager's portfolio choices, might depend on the final performances of each of the mutual fund's competitors. Our simplified structure can be justified in an environment where there is a large (infinite) number of mutual funds that choose different "alternative" securities. Their relative performances over the year would be a smooth, approximately normally distributed, function around a mean performance. This would justify (as we do in our empirical work) using the "average" performance of all mutual funds as a sufficient statistic for comparing any given mutual fund's performance.
The fund manager maximizes his expected utility of wealth (compensation) at the end of the tournament by choosing the fund's asset allocation at each point in time during the assessment period. 15 This maximization problem can be written as
subject to the process followed by G given in equation (4) 
where α α α σ σ
The first order condition with respect to ω implies that the portfolio proportion invested in the alternative securities is
Substituting this back into the Bellman equation, one obtains an equilibrium partial differential equation for J:
The solution to equation (8) 
must satisfy the boundary condition J(G T ,T) = U(P[G T ]), which
requires that the manager's utility function and compensation schedule be specified. We make the standard, if not reasonable, assumption that utility displays constant relative risk aversion,
γ /γ, where γ < 1.
15 By equating the manager's compensation to his wealth, we assume that other sources of personal wealth are negligible and that the manager does not hedge his compensation risk via his personal portfolio. This is a standard assumption, though Grinblatt and Titman (1989) is an exception.
If U(P[G T ]) is not concave in G T , as may be the case if P[G T
] is convex, a solution may be characterized using a concavifying argument similar to Carpenter (2000) .
Regarding the manager's compensation schedule, we choose a specification that allows it to be either a concave, linear, or convex function of fund performance. This generality is important because the model is the basis of our empirical tests, and prior evidence suggests that compensation may not always be convex. While most empirical studies of mutual funds, such as Sirri and Tufano (1998) , emphasize the convexity of fund flows and compensation to performance, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find that the relation appears non-convex for certain types of mutual funds at particular performance levels. 17 Moreover, a linear function of performance might better describe the compensation of other types of money managers. 18 The following compensation function provides empirical flexibility yet leads to fairly simple and intuitive solutions to the manager's portfolio choice problem.
where b > 0, c > 0, and a > -b/c. Note that when 0 < c < 1, the manager's compensation is a concave function of performance, G T . Compensation is linear in performance when c = 1, while when c > 1 the function is convex. 19 If a is set equal to 1 and one takes the limit of P as c goes to infinity, the function becomes the exponential form
In the linear case of c = 1, the parameter a can be interpreted as a fixed component of a manager's fee schedule, and, in principle, it could be positive or negative. For example, if the manager incurs fixed expenses (overhead) that are not explicitly reimbursed by the fund, then a 17 In addition, other agency concerns between a mutual fund advisor (the entity that directly receives the advisory fees paid by the mutual fund) and the portfolio manager that it hires could affect the manager's compensation. For example, poor performance by a portfolio manager may be personally more damaging than what would be predicted by fund flows if such performance results in the manager's termination. Khorana (1996) and Chevalier Ellison (1999) provide empirical evidence that underperformance increases the probability that a manager is terminated. The threat of firing could make the manager's compensation appear non-convex, at least when performance is poor. 18 Empirical evidence in Del Guercio and Tkac (1999) finds a performance -fund flow relation that appears linear for pension fund managers. They conclude that pension managers have less incentive to risk-shift than mutual fund managers. 19 The function could be further generalized by multiplication of a positive constant, that is,
, where d > 0, but this extension has no effect on portfolio choice. If performance is defined as the difference in, rather than the ratio of, returns, then compensation is convex (concave) in D T ≡ lnG T whenever a + bG T is positive (negative). Since it will be shown that a + (b/c)G T is always positive in equilibrium, compensation can be a convex function of the difference in returns even when 0 < c ≤ 1. Hence, defining performance as the difference in returns expands the cases for which compensation is a convex function of performance.
may be negative. In general, when c ≠ 1, the parameter a does not translate directly to a fixed fee, but its sign continues to determine whether total compensation has the potential to be nonpositive. Lowering a (possibly below zero) decreases total compensation, but sensible solutions to the manager's portfolio choice problem require that a > -b/c. This restriction provides the manager with a feasible portfolio strategy that guarantees positive compensation (wealth) at the end of the tournament. The manager can avoid zero wealth (and infinite marginal utility) by investing solely in the benchmark portfolio for the entire assessment period, since then
and an interior solution to the manager's portfolio choice problem exists. This is always the case when γ < 0, that is, the manager's risk-aversion exceeds that of logarithmic utility. However, if 0 < γ < 1 and c is sufficiently greater than 1 so that γc > 1, then U(P[G T ]) is convex and the manager chooses ω to maximize the expected rate of return on G. From equation (4), this implies setting ω = +∞ if α G > 0, and ω = -∞ if α G < 0.
Assuming cγ < 1, the solution to equation (8) is 1 , (10) is substituted into equation (7), then the manager's optimal proportion invested in the alternative securities is
Note from the restriction a > -b/c that the term ( )
is always non-negative in equilibrium, even when a < 0. To see this, suppose that a is negative and that G declines sufficiently from its initial value of unity, so that ( ) so that the alternative securities' portfolio weight responds inversely to relative performance.
We summarize the manager's portfolio behavior with the following proposition.
Proposition I: If a fund manager's utility displays constant relative risk aversion and has compensation given by (9), then when cγ < 1 an interior solution to the portfolio choice problem exists. Moreover,
, whose sign is opposite to that of the compensation parameter a. When a is positive (negative), a decline in the fund's relative performance leads the fund manager to deviate more (less) from the benchmark index.
The case a > 0 provides theoretical justification for Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny's (1992) argument that successful managers attempt to lock-in gains. Furthermore, such behavior is likely to increase with the convexity of compensation, since when γ < 0 one can show that a larger value of c makes portfolio choice more sensitive to prior performance. In contrast, the a < 0 case leads to managerial risk-shifting behavior that is opposite to that assumed in recent empirical studies of tournaments. For this case, total compensation is not automatically bounded 20 That portfolio choice is independent of the investment horizon is a common feature of standard portfolio choice problems such as Merton (1971) . The solution in (11) is analogous to that of a standard portfolio choice problem where the alternative securities portfolio plays the role of a risky asset portfolio and the benchmark portfolio is the risk-free asset. From this perspective, α G and σ G are the risky asset's excess at zero, and a manager more closely matches the benchmark as performance declines to prevent zero compensation and infinite marginal utility.
Proposition I is consistent with the findings of Carpenter (2000) and Cuoco and Kaniel (1999) . When they assume that compensation equals a positive component plus a call option written on the portfolio's relative performance, they find that a manager increases tracking error as performance declines. This compares to our model's case of a > 0, since in both instances the compensation rule is restricted to always be positive, and portfolio managers need not fear obtaining zero wealth when increasing their tracking error risk. In contrast, when Cuoco and Kaniel (1999) assume that compensation also includes the manager writing a put option on his performance, the manager reduces his tracking error as performance declines. Here, compensation includes a penalty for poor performance, and it compares to our case with a < 0, since in both instances the compensation structure is not constrained to be positive. Hence, we see that as performance declines, the manager more fully hedges against zero compensation by more closely matching the benchmark.
While our model is not rich enough to adequately judge how different compensation schedules affect the welfare of fund shareholders, the fact that a manager's investment strategy is independent of past performance when a = 0 would appear to favor such a compensation rule.
Since risk-shifting generates additional transactions costs, setting a = 0 avoids this expense.
Proposition I also has implications for the risk measures chosen by Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Busse (2001) . Each of these studies test the following relation:
where σ ij denotes the standard deviation of the rate of return on mutual fund j's portfolio during the i th half of the year. Mutual fund j = L is a "loser" that displayed relatively poor performance in the first half of the year, while mutual fund j = W is a "winner" that had relatively good performance during the first half. The implication is that a mutual fund that is a mid-year loser should increase the variance of its fund more than a fund that was a mid-year winner.
Does our model imply the inequality in (13)? To answer this question, note that the proportion invested in the alternative securities that would minimize the variance of the mutual fund's rate of return given by equation (3) is return and its standard deviation of return, respectively, and risk aversion is (1-cγ)bG/(ac+bG). Hence, the
Written in terms of this variance minimizing portfolio allocation, the optimal portfolio allocation in (11) becomes
This allows us to state the following proposition: 
IV. Empirical Methodology
This section outlines the empirical technique used to examine the link between a mutual fund's performance and its choice of risk. Unlike previous tests that allow a fund's risk to change only once per calendar year (see inequality (13) 
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The empirical studies of Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Busse (2001) 22 Note that since tournaments are assumed to occur each calendar year, G is reset to 1 at the beginning of January each year, even though we use multiple years of fund returns to estimate these processes. 23 While most research assumes that changes in a fund's risk are due to managerial incentive problems, Koski and Pontiff (1999) propose another explanation for why a fund's variance could be inversely related to its prior performance. If better performing funds receive greater cash inflows, then a fund's return variance will decrease until its new (riskless) cash is fully invested in equities or until the fund increases its exposure by purchasing equity derivatives. Because transactions costs are mitigated by gradual, rather than immediate, purchase of stocks, and some mutual funds are restricted from holding derivatives, the variance of a fund's returns may decline temporarily following a cash inflow. Hence, our empirical work on the link between performance and variance provides new evidence on this alternative hypothesis. Our second set of estimates analyzes the process followed by an individual mutual fund's change in relative performance, dG t . An analysis of dG t is arguably more interesting and meaningful than studying the variable R t because our theoretical model places strong restrictions on the mean and variance of changes in a fund's relative performance, not of its return. As shown in the Appendix, the model implies that the equilibrium dG t process satisfies ( ) ( )
where dG t = G t+1 -G t refers to the change in relative, calendar-year performance from the beginning to end of month t, are reversed. In this case c 1 > 0 (c 1 < 0) would indicate that the variance of the fund's portfolio increases (decreases) as performance declines. We impose this restriction simply to make a uniform comparison of the parameter estimates across funds. 25 As discussed in the previous footnote, assuming ( ) Estimating the parameters of equation (17) is equivalent to estimating those of the fund's "excess return" or "tracking error" process 
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From the definitions of d 0 and d 1 , so that the fund's excess return volatility is inversely proportional to performance. These results confirm Proposition I and the optimal allocation rules given in equations (11) and (12).
Equations (16) and (17) form the basis of our empirical work. The next section discusses the source of the data used to test these equations.
V. Data Description
Our information on mutual fund returns and characteristics come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor-Bias Free Mutual Fund database. The sample covers mutual funds that operated during the period from January 1962 to September 2001. We selected domestic equity funds whose investment style could be broadly classified as either a "growth" fund or a "growth and income" fund. 26 We also chose only those funds that reported returns for at least 36 continuous months, this condition being necessary to obtain reasonable parameter estimates of each fund's returns process. These selection criteria gave us 2,658 growth (G) funds, 606 growth and income (GI) funds, and 879 "style-mixed" (SM) funds, the latter category being funds whose reported investment style was either growth or growth and income during only part of their life. Each of these three fund groups was given a different benchmark index, S t , set equal to an equally-weighted average of the returns on all funds within the group, including funds that lacked the minimum 36 months of returns. Figure 1 shows the sample's number of G, GI, and SM mutual funds in operation during each month of our sample period. The number of funds grew rapidly over the 1990's and peaks approximately three years prior to the sample period's end since no new funds were added during the last 36 months. This reflects the parameter estimation constraint that a fund report at least three years of returns. As an indicator of a fund's size relative to all other sample funds, we computed an asset size score by assigning a rank score from 0 (smallest) to 1 (largest) for each fund according to its total net asset value at the end of each year. This score is then averaged over each year of the fund's life. On average, GI funds are only slightly larger than G funds, while the average SM size is the highest of the three groups, probably reflecting the greater average age of SM funds.
G funds, however, tend to be the fastest growing funds while SM funds are the slowest. Finally, somewhat greater than 80 % of our sample's G and GI funds were in operation (surviving) at the end of our sample period, whereas only 73 % of SM funds had not been liquidated or merged out of existence.
VI. Results
The first set of results are maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters describing the individual mutual funds' returns, equation (16). Though not a relationship that is predicted by our model, we estimate this equation because it is in the spirit of tests performed by Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Busse (2001 would respond by increasing its annual standard deviation of return by a negligible 0.14 % (-0.082x(-0.0051)x√12), while the fund with the 75 th percentile estimate of c 1 = 0.0332 would decrease its annual standard deviation of return by 0.94 % (-0.082x(0.0332)x√12). These volatility changes are 0.8 % and -5.2 %, respectively, of the median unconditional volatility of the funds in our sample. Hence, the response of portfolio volatility to performance is mild for most funds. 27 The restriction that the expected return on each fund be positive is a relatively loose condition that was not binding for the great majority of funds. See These findings, in particular the evidence of relatively more positive than negative estimates of c 1 , run counter to the results of Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) who use Morningstar monthly returns data and a different empirical methodology. 30 Rather, our results support Busse (2001) who employs the same methodology as Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) but uses daily returns data. Since Busse (2001) argues that his use of daily data produces more efficient estimates of the volatility of funds, our paper's consistency with his suggests that our new, arguably more efficient, estimation method compensates for lower frequency data.
As we emphasized earlier, our model shows that a poorly-performing fund does not necessarily choose to increase the variance of its portfolio returns, implying that the sign of c 1 is ambiguous. However, the theory is unambiguous regarding the form of a mutual fund's change in relative performance process, dG t , whose parameters are the same as the process followed by the fund's excess return or tracking error, dD t ≈ R t -R St . Recall that the conditional standard
. The model predicts that d 1 is non-negative, while if d 0 is positive (negative), tracking error volatility increases (decreases) with underperformance.
To investigate this implication of the model, we calculated a second set of maximum likelihood parameter estimates based on equation (17), which is equivalent to the excess return process in equation (18). For each of the 4,143 funds, numerical maximization was carried out subject to the theoretical restrictions µ G ≥ 0 and 0
The results are summarized in Table III . It gives the distribution of estimates for the sum d 0 +d 1 , which is approximately a fund's unconditional monthly standard deviation of tracking error. The median tracking error volatilities for G, GI, and SM style funds are 3.15 %, 1.70 %, and 2.39 %, respectively. The G and SM median volatilities are slightly higher than, and GI median volatility is comparable to, median tracking error volatilities found by Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002) .
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Next, consider the estimates of d 1 , summarized in the third row of each fund style panel of Table III . 87 % of all funds have a positive estimate of d 1 , and the estimate is positive and statistically significant for over 70 % of all funds. This implies that behavior consistent with exponential compensation, the case of d 1 = 0, can be ruled out for most mutual funds. Most 30 The qualitative nature of our results is not sensitive to our choice of CRSP data. An earlier version of this paper that used Morningstar data also found significantly more positive than negative estimates of c 1 . The results using the (survivorship-biased) Morningstar data are available from the authors upon request. 31 As was done in the estimation of the funds' return processes, the latter constraint was imposed as two constraints,
32 They use the S&P500 index and two other benchmarks constructed from Fama-French and Sharpe style models to compute mutual funds' tracking errors. Their median tracking error volatilities for these three benchmarks are 1.95, 1.51, and 1.41, respectively.
interesting are the statistics on d 0 , reported in the second row of each panel in Table III Taken together, the evidence on d 0 and d 1 shows that the great majority of funds raise tracking error volatility as performance declines, but the magnitude of this effect is not as large as would be predicted by an exponential compensation schedule. Still, this is solid support for the type of tracking error risk-shifting found by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) , but not the type of total volatility risk-shifting reported by Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) . Let us now investigate in more detail which types of funds are more likely to engage in shifting their tracking error risk.
Columns one and two of Table IV Table   IV shows the differences in the averages of the two sets' characteristics, and the last column indicates whether the difference is statistically significant.
The evidence in Table IV accords with our intuition regarding which funds are more likely to gamble following poor performance. Funds that raise their tracking error as performance declines are significantly younger and smaller, and have shorter manager tenures and a lower probability of survival, than other funds. 33 Also, they tend to have relatively low front loads but high back loads, a possible indication that they are anxious to attract new money but wish to dissuade old money from leaving. However, Table IV also shows that these funds average slower asset growth, which could indicate that their gambles are often unsuccessful. It may also reflect the likelihood that these younger funds face greater competition for investors' savings than funds with a longer track record.
VII. Conclusion
By modeling the incentives of a manager engaged in a mutual fund tournament, the situation assumed by recent empirical studies, we have provided greater insights into the manager's optimal portfolio strategy. Perhaps the most important implication of our model is that a mutual fund's tracking error volatility, not its total return volatility, is what a portfolio manager increases as the fund's performance declines. More specifically, there is an ambiguous connection between prior performance and a fund's total return variance, and this could explain the conflicting results of some recent empirical studies that have attempted to test for such a link.
This study also developed a new, more powerful technique for estimating the relation between a mutual fund's prior performance and its risk-taking. The method allows a fund's risk to respond to its relative performance at each observation date, not just once per calendar year.
Also, unlike previous methods, it is able to estimate risk-shifting behavior for individual mutual funds, thereby allowing for differences between funds. We illustrated this technique by applying it to the monthly returns of more than 4,000 growth and growth and income mutual funds over the period 1962 to 2001.
As our theory predicts might happen, the empirical results show that most funds do not increase their variance of returns as their relative performance declines. If anything, there appears to be a positive relationship between performance and portfolio variance, opposite to the received wisdom, but consistent with newer evidence by Busse (2001) . However, our results do provide strong support for the theory's predicted inverse relation between relative performance changes and tracking error volatility. Moreover, we find that younger and smaller mutual funds and those with low front loads but high back loads appear more likely to increase their tracking error following a performance decline.
This appendix shows that equation (2) in the text is the equilibrium process for a portfolio of individual alternative securities that are chosen optimally by the fund manager. The appendix then derives the equilibrium process for a mutual fund's relative performance when the manager's compensation takes the general form given in equation (9) in the text.
As before, assume that the benchmark index follows equation (1) in the text, but let there be n different alternative securities. The date t value of the i th security, A i (t), is assumed to follow the process
where σ S dzσ i dq i = σ Si dt and σ i dq i σ j dq j = σ ij dt for all i, j = 1,…,n. It is assumed that σ S , σ i , σ Si , and σ ij are constants. α S and α i may be time varying but the spread between their expected rates of return, α i -α S , is assumed to be constant.
If the fund manager allocates a portfolio proportion of w i to alternative security i and 
Let w ≡ [w 1 w 2 … w n ]′ denote the nx1 vector of portfolio weights. A simple application of Itô's lemma shows that the fund's relative performance, G ≡ V/S, follows the process ( ) 
The Bellman equation for the manager's optimal portfolio choice problem is then
where Ω is an nxn matrix whose i,j th element equals which is independent of the fund's relative performance, G. Since the optimal amounts invested in the individual alternative securities are constant shares of the total amount invested in alternative securities, the fund manager's problem can be simplified to one of choosing between two different assets at each point in time. One asset is the benchmark portfolio following the process in equation (1) of the text and the other is the alternative security portfolio following the process given in equation (2) We next derive the equilibrium process for a mutual fund's relative performance. For a given asset allocation, the fund's relative performance follows the process of equation (4) of the text. This can be re-written as
is a standard Brownian motion process and ω * is the portfolio manager's optimal proportion invested in the alternative asset. Using equation (11) to substitute for ω * gives
which can be re-written as
. With no loss in generality (dx can be redefined as -dx) the standard deviation in (A.9) can be assumed positive implying 34 Equation (A.6) holds even when one of the alternative securities is assumed to earn a risk-free return of r. "Growth," "Maximum Capital Gains," "Small Capitalization Growth," or "Long Term Growth," are classified as growth funds. Mutual funds with an objective of "Growth and Income" or "Growth with Current Income" are classified as growth and income funds. Style-mixed funds are mutual funds with a style of growth or growth and income for only part of their lives. Index funds as well as funds with less than 36 consecutive monthly returns are excluded. This sample contains 2658 growth funds, 606 pure growth-income funds, and 879 style-mixed funds in this study. Age is defined as the number of years from the fund's inception date until the date it expired or, for surviving funds, the end-of-sample date of September 2001. Manager tenure is the average number of years that an individual manages a fund's portfolio. A fund's asset size score is computed by assigning a rank score from 0(smallest) to 1(largest) for each fund according to its total net asset value at the end of each year. This score is then averaged over each year of the fund's life. A fund's asset growth is calculated as the average annual log change in total net assets, and the proportion surviving is the proportion of total sample funds in operation as of September 2001. 
